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ABSTRACT
This essay explores Dirkie Smit’s theological thinking from a hermeneutical perspective. 
Smit’s linking up with Karl Barth’s view on confessing, as can be seen in the Accompany-
ing Letter of the Belhar Confession, is taken as illustration. After a historical perspective 
on the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer with its central concepts of 
historicality, contextuality, orientation and dialogue, it is demonstrated how these concepts 
also play a significant role in Smit’s way of doing theology. Barth’s three aspects of Reformed 
confessions (historical context, the one message and the one church) are associated with 
three Gadamer’s concepts of historicality, orientation and contextuality. While Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics move from application (contextuality) to practical philosophy, 
Smit’s theology moves from contextuality to public theology. Confessing the old Christian 
creed that Jesus is Lord in the public sphere as the church’s decisive orientation contains the 
risk of ambiguity within an ongoing dialogue. The argument of the article is that the core 
of Smit’s theological thinking can be understood as orientation and ambiguity amidst the 
dialectic of historicality and contextuality. 
IntroductIon
In this essay the core of Dirkie Smit’s theological thinking will be explored from a hermeneutical 
perspective. The focus is not on his theory of hermeneutics, but on his theology; not on his 
thinking about how understanding happens, but on a decisive hermeneutical dimension in 
his thinking about God. Although Smit is well aware of the ongoing debates in hermeneutical 
thinking and had written a book and several articles on it (Smit 1987, 1998a and 1998b), the 
primary focus of his thought is not hermeneutics, but theology. It is like Gerhard Ebeling’s 
statement about Luther’s hermeneutics: He didn’t introduce a new kind of hermeneutics, 
but discovered the gospel in a new way and, by discovering the gospel in a new way, a new 
hermeneutics was constituted (Ebeling 1969:275- 276). Smit’s way of doing theology explores 
the gospel in a refreshing way. By doing this he opens up several exciting hermeneutical 
dimensions. In this article the question simply concerns a decisive hermeneutical aspect of 
his theology.
To answer this question, I will first give a historical perspective on the most important aspect of 
the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans Georg Gadamer, namely the problem of “application”. 
This aspect resonates with a decisive hermeneutical dimension in Smit’s theological thinking. 
I will illustrate this by his reference to Karl Barth’s view on confessing, as can be seen in the 
Accompanying Letter to the Belhar Confession. With this approach I would like to argue that, 
from a hermeneutical perspective, the core of Smit’s theological thinking can be understood 
as orientation and ambiguity amidst the dialectic of historicality and contextuality.
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Gadamer: from applIcatIon to practIcal theoloGy
The problem of application
Schleiermacher, the father of modern hermeneutics who introduced a general hermeneutics 
of understanding, excludes application from his hermeneutics. According to him, application 
is not part of the act of understanding. Application is a separate action following the 
completed act of understanding. Schleiermacher refers to Ernesti’s distinction between 
three “abilities” or “arts” – subtillitas intelligendi, subtillitas explicandi and subtillitas applicandi. 
According to Schleiermacher, hermeneutics has to do only with the subtillitas intelligendi – it 
is the art or ability to understand. The art to explain is part of hermeneutics only in so far as it 
is the explication of what is already understood. The moment explication becomes a creative 
activity it is already part of rhetoric (Schleiermacher 1974:31; Fouché 1978:49 -50).
The way Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics developed cancelled his initial approach so that 
understanding and explication became intertwined and inse parable.1 However, his exclusion 
of application from the heart of hermeneutical thinking is precisely the Achilles heel of his 
thinking. This redirected his her meneutics to focus on the true intention of the author instead 
of on the truth intended by the author (Fouché 1978:104- 105).
For Gadamer application is not a separate action that follows on an indepen dent and 
completed act of understanding. In his answer to the main question posed in his magnum opus 
Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method) – “What happens when we understand?” (Gadamer 
1975:XVI) – application or the truth or relevance of what we understand is indissolubly part 
of the process of understanding. The reason for this is his concept of historicality by which 
understanding is not primarily an act of the human subject, but a happening within the 
overwhelming, powerful working of history by which we are transformed. This concept of 
historicality opens up a whole new view and experience of the process of understanding of 
which application forms part (Gadamer 1975:157 -161, 290 -323; Fouché 2001:71- 88).
From historicality to dialogue
Gadamer’s concept of history2 is not the romantic idea of a wonderful past that can be studied 
by gathering bits and pieces as positive facts. It is not even the idea of an ongoing and 
never-ending movement of occurrences which can be viewed from some point of reference. 
History is rather the all encapsulating and overwhelming power of occurrences that not only 
transforms us, but is always already accompanying us on our way. There is no point of view 
outside time and space from where one can observe and interpret history, one is always 
already part of ongoing occurrences, always already making sense of them, and frequently 
reinterpreting them according to new situations (Gadamer 1975:250 -290). In short, one is not 
(like river rafting adventurers) standing on a hilltop searching for appropriate routes around 
the rocks within the rapids, one finds oneself within the rapids and challenged to navigate 
1 The reason for this is simply Schleiermacher’s strong convictions on the identity of language and thought 
throughout his hermeneutical journey in his earlier and later phases – this view differs from Kimmerle 
(Kimmerle 1957; Fouché 1978:46 -48, 83- 93).
2 Gadamer’s concept of history can at best be translated as “historicality”. Historicity denotes the mere 
ongoing flow of history; historicality is the noun referring to something which is “historical” in the sense 
that it is happening and is meaningful … that we are also involved in this meaningful “happening” is not 
directly seen in the word, but should be explained.
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without any view from above. One can do no other than to change strategy with every new 
view of the oncoming, dangerous rocks.
Gadamer uses different metaphors to illustrate how understanding takes place within the 
movement of historicality (for example, “fusion of horizons”, “dialogue”, “tragedy”, et cetera) and 
the metaphor of dialogue serves as a model. We are encapsulated in tradition, an interpreted 
tradition or living awareness of the truth claim of tradition. One lives within an always already 
meaningful tradition that does not lie behind one, belonging to the past, but that remains 
relevant. One remains in a constant dialogue with tradition. When one’s understanding works 
properly, this dialogue is, according to Gadamer, not the type of dialogue where tradition as 
the counterpart of dialogue amounts to mere facts (as in the positive sciences) or a romantic 
and very interesting past (as in the methods of historism), but rather as a “you” where the 
otherness of the other is acknowledged and where one is open to correction and enrichment.3 
Tradition is like a “you” that is not “I” and that can tell me something I do not know. In a dialogue 
with such a counterpart, the outcome is not the standpoint of the one or the other, but rather 
something which is new. That which is new is something which one could never have come 
to was it not for the dialogue (Gadamer 1975:329 -360; Fouché 2001:88 -95; Fouché and Smit 
1996:80 -83). Understanding as a process of historicality is the ongoing dialogue, “the dialogue 
which we are”.4
Understanding as a constant dialogue with a relevant tradition where new meaning is 
generated, is always already “applied”. Understanding is constantly evolving from application 
as the ongoing realisation of the relevance or truth claim of what one is trying to understand. 
The notion of application in Gadamer’s hermeneutics differs from Schleiermacher’s banning of 
it to some other discipline outside of the field of hermeneutics; application is drawn into – or 
rather, is recognised as being at – the centre of hermeneutics.
From dialogue to practical philosophy
The “I” of the dialogue is not a bloodless or abstract subject who registers positive and objective 
facts, but an involved “I” – passionately involved as a human being fluctuating between hope 
and despair. In Gadamer’s hermeneutics understanding is not a purely intellectual activity; it 
is a process of involvement and action. It can be illustrated in his use of Aristotle’s definition 
of tragedy, as well as in his linking up with the key concept of phronesis in Aristotle’s ethics.
Aristotle gives a remarkable definition of tragedy. His definition includes not only that which 
occurs onstage, but also what happens to the audience offstage. A tragedy creates emotions 
of eleos and phobos (sorrow and fear) in the audience – sorrow for the person who experiences 
such a tragic event and fear for the possibility that it might happen to themselves (Gadamer 
1975:122 -127; Fouché 2001:64- 67). The “I” in the process of understanding is not bloodless but 
humane.
What is more, understanding that incorporates application is not only emotional involvement, 
3 For Gadamer, the hermeneutic experience is a Hegelian dialectic: The world is different from what one 
thinks it is, it is learning through faults and correction like Aeschylus’s pathei mathos – learning through 
suffering.
4 This is the phrase with which Gadamer links up with a poem of Hölderlin (Friedensfeier): “Seit ein 
Gespräch wir sind und hören können von einander” (Since we are a dialogue and we are able to listen to 
each other).
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it is also an involvement of the will resulting in deliberate decision making and action. To 
illustrate this Gadamer refers to Aristotle’s concept of phronesis. According to Aristotle, we do 
not really know what the good, which should be practised in every situation, is. We do not 
even have a clear concept of what the good is – we have only a vague and general idea of 
this good. In the light of our vague and general idea of what is good, we have to weigh up the 
different possibilities against each other in every concrete and particular situation in order 
to act. This is the activity of phronesis, common sense or prudent judgement. The weighing 
up of possibilities is not solely a matter of intellectual playfulness; it ends in a decision to 
act. Gadamer uses Aristotle’s idea of phronesis as metaphor for how understanding happens. 
Understanding is also the prudent activity of connecting the general with the particular, 
the common-sense deliberation on how the general truth claim of tradition connects to the 
particular situation and what it compels us to think and to do (Gadamer 1975:295- 307).
Understanding happens in the same way as phronesis in practical philosophy. Practical 
philosophy is not – as we tend to think – the application of some theoretical idea; it is rather a 
philosophy of praxis5 (Gadamer 1974, 1976a, 1976b, 1980, 1983, 1999; Fouché 2001:128 -141; 
Bernstein 1982; Foster 1991; Riedel 1972 and 1974). Praxis is also the everyday life of decision-
making regarding what is good and useful for the community and what is bad and should be 
rejected for the sake of a humane society. Logical reasoning results in a statement or theory; 
within practical philosophy practical reasoning results in a decision to act. Understanding 
functions within practical philosophy as phronesis (practical reasoning or common-sense 
deliberation). Its conclusion is not a theoretical statement, but a practical decision on a new 
orientation towards life and action.
It is for this reason that Gadamer typifies hermeneutics as practical philosophy and views 
understanding as phronesis. For him, hermeneutics is the heir of practical philosophy – the 
vindicating of the noble task of the citizen, namely decision making according to one’s own 
deliberation and responsibility instead of leaving it to the experts (Gadamer 1976a, 1976b; 
Dutt 1995:71 -72).
dIrkIe SmIt: from contextualIty to publIc theoloGy
From the above historical perspective on Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics a decisive 
hermeneutical dimension in Smit’s theology is quite obvious. The prominent characteristic of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics is his incorporation of the problem of application within the centre 
of understanding that transforms the face of hermeneutics to practical philosophy; a decisive 
hermeneutical dimension in Smit’s way of doing theology is contextuality, which transforms 
the face of theology to public theology (Cf. Smit 2007a & 2008).
To illustrate this I refer to the motivation for the Belhar Confession found in the Accompanying 
5 Aristotle differentiates between three types of knowledge – episteme, phronesis and techne. Episteme 
refers to exact knowledge, such as mathematics, and techne to knowledge as the skill to produce 
something exactly according to a blueprint. Phronesis is practical reasoning within the field of uncertainty 
– the everyday life in the community or praxis. Practical philosophy is philosophy of praxis. In episteme 
and techne the teacher has the exact knowledge and teaches the student who knows nothing; in phronesis 
within practical philosophy the more experienced one teaches the less experienced one and both ask, from 
a position of uncertainty and of not knowing, what the best conduct would be. The choice for the best 
conduct is made from phronesis or common sense.
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Letter (which is part of the Confession) – Smit was, of course, instrumental in the formulation 
of both these documents. The motivation links up with Karl Barth’s reasons for the necessity 
for a church to confess her faith in an official confession, not directly, but broadly speaking. 
In his essay, No Other Motives Would Give Us the right – Reflections on Contextuality from a 
Reformed Experience, Smit quotes Barth’s definition of a Reformed creed (given in the latter’s 
1925 lecture “The Desirability and Possibility of a Universal Reformed Creed”, at the World 
Alliance of Reformed Churches in Cardiff): A Reformed creed is the statement, spontaneously 
and publicly formulated by a Christian community within a geographically limited area, 
which, until further action, defines its character to outsiders; and which, until further action, 
gives guidance for its own doctrine of life; it is a formulation of the insight currently given 
to the whole Christian Church by the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, witnessed to by Holy 
Scriptures alone (Smit 2007b:159).
Smit refers to three key aspects of this definition of a Reformed creed that, although formulated 
differently, are also found in the Accompanying Letter. These key aspects are the motivation for 
the creation of the Belhar Confession. They also form the core of Smit’s way of doing theology, 
albeit in a slightly different philosophical perspective.
Three aspects of a Reformed confession
First: the importance of the historical context. The Accompanying Letter reads: “We are deeply 
conscious that moments of such seriousness can arise in the life of the Church that it may feel 
the need to confess its faith anew in the light of a specific situation” (in Smit 2007b:157). This 
aspect has to do with the historical context, the time, the circumstances, where the truth of 
the gospel is threatened in such a way that a status confessionis is declared. This compels the 
church to confess her faith publicly. In this confession the truth of the gospel is to be stated 
and the misleading lie is to be rejected (Smit 2007b:159 -161). Second: the one message. In the 
words of the Accompanying Letter, “… only if it is considered that the heart of the gospel is so 
threatened as to be at stake … Accordingly, we make this confession … as something we are 
obliged to do for the sake of the gospel ….” (in Smit 2007b:158).
The Confession is not intended to be a contribution to a debate; it is a cry from the heart. It 
is done in freedom, without fear and without demands made on anyone; it is done in the 
hope that others will confess in the same way (Smit 2007b:162 -163). Third: the one church. 
According to the Accompanying Letter,
[t]his confession is not aimed at specific people or groups of people or a church or 
churches. We proclaim it against a false doctrine, against an ideological distortion which 
threatens the gospel itself in our church and our country … We are deeply aware of the 
deceiving nature of such a false doctrine … Therefore it is that we speak pleadingly rather 
than accusingly. We plead for reconciliation … which follows on conversion and change 
of attitudes and structures … Our prayer is that this act of confession will not place false 
stumbling blocks in the way and thereby cause and foster false division, but rather that 
it will be reconciling and uniting … We pray that our brothers and sisters throughout the 
Dutch Reformed Church family, but also outside it, will want to make this new beginning 
with us, so that we can be free together, and together may walk the road of reconciliation 
and justice (in Smit 2007b:158 -159).
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Three philosophical aspects in an on-going dialogue
From a philosophical and hermeneutical perspective these three key aspects of confession 
can be associated with three similar philosophical concepts, namely historicality, contextuality 
and orientation.
The first aspect – the importance of the historical context or the moment of truth – can be 
associated with the philosophical concept of historicality. His toricality is the powerful working 
of meaning through history. It comes to the fore in tradition, in creeds and in customs; it is 
actualised in the understanding of the creeds and the experience of the customs. For this 
reason it also finds its way into deceiving ideologies and ways of living that make people blind 
to each other and distorts the truth.
The second aspect – the one message – can be associated with the philosophical concept of 
orientation. In Aristotle’s ethics, orientation is a vague idea of the good. What “the good” really 
is, is time and again realised and discovered in concrete situations where different possibilities 
are weighed up against each other and decisions are made. In Smit’s theology this orientation 
can be expressed in the words of the first Christian creed (which is also part of the closing 
phrases of the Belhar Confession): “Jesus is the Lord”. The immediate reaction to this statement 
may be that this creed is not at all vague or ambiguous. My point is that it has, of course, been 
clearly stated and confessed for ages, but it is still a vague and ambiguous concept because 
it is not very clear in every situation what Jesus’ Lordship entails. It is rather that we have to 
pray: Veni Creator Spiritus! We have to seek and discover what the meaning of this crucial and 
ancient Christian creed is.6 This is precisely the endeavour of Smit’s theological thinking.
The third aspect – the one church – can be associated with the philosophical concept of 
contextuality. Contextuality can easily be misunderstood as if it is the interpreting theologian 
who applies some eternal truth to the context. That will be in line with Schleiermacher’s idea 
of how something that is clearly understood can be applied afterwards. From a Gadamerian 
perspective as well as from Smit’s approach that would be an objectionable idea. Contextuality 
is, rather, the meaningful possibilities of tradition in our situation in light of the orientation 
which is the confession that Jesus is Lord.
There exists an ongoing dialogue between historicality, contextuality and orientation. It is 
possible to differentiate between the different “partners” in the dialogue, but not in any clear-
cut way as in Gadamer’s description of it. In Gadamer’s view, dialogue occurs between the 
interpreter and the historical text. The dialogue has a Hegelian structure of thesis, anti thesis 
and synthesis – the thesis is the preconception (Vorurteil) or preliminary understanding of 
the text, the anti thesis is the text with its traditional meaning, and the synthesis the “fusion 
of horizons” (the new understanding). There is thus an ongoing movement of to and fro from 
which a point of view emerges that is not the opinion of the one or the other, but a new point 
of view.
The dialogue between historicality, contextuality and orientation is even more complex. The 
interpreter or theologian is not above or against any one of the “partners” in the dialogue, but 
6 Peter concluded his sermon on the Day of Pentecost with the Christian creed: “All the people of Israel, 
then, are to know for sure that this Jesus, whom you crucified, is the one that God has made Lord and 
Messiah!” (Acts 2:36). However, he still had to learn in humbling ways what this confession entailed – 
once in a vision from God (Acts 10), another time in a public rebuke from Paul! (Gal. 2:11 -14).
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rather is part of each of them. Historicality, as the tradition of the creeds and customs that is 
actualised in thinking and experiencing, is an overwhelming power. It can sweep one away 
toward ideologies that distort the truth and that blind one to proper conduct. Orientation, 
as the creed “Jesus is Lord”, is the default creed of every theologian so that everyone is always 
already convinced that he or she is thinking and living by this confession. However, this 
confession often amounts to confusion because of matter of course attitudes and unwillingness 
to be open and to stand corrected. Contextuality, as the meaningful possibility within our 
context, is also an always already happening in such a way that, within a distorted ideological 
historical situation, theologians can (and have!) declared that to live as a divided church and 
to justify a system of injustice is obedience to Jesus as Lord!
The important point to realise is that we are always already drawn into the dialogue of 
historicality, contextuality and orientation. The crucial question is: How ecumenical is our 
dialogue? For Smit it is of critical importance that the dialogue with mothers and fathers of 
the past should go as far back as possible, and the dialogue with sisters and brothers in the 
present should be as broad as possible. In his paper on the relationship between the so called 
contextual and universal theology, he is quite clear:
In continuously searching to remain faithful to this gospel, we are less concerned for 
“universality”, which reflects typically modernist assumptions, but deeply concerned for 
catholicity and ecumenicity, referring to the fullness of the truth and of the one church of 
this Triune God, through all ages and in all possible localities, in all its irreducible richness, 
creaturely, culturally and historically (Smit 2007b:178).
The risk and ambiguity of confession
Confessing in a historical moment of confusion is running a risk. The confession may be 
misunderstood, it may be rejected, it may divide instead of unite, it may be ridiculed as a 
caricature of the truth … actually, it is not that it “may be…”, it is rather that it “will be …!” In 
his later work, Karl Barth refers to four characteristics of (the moment of ) a confession. They 
are: (a) confession is “without an ulterior goal” – the only concern is the honour of God; (b) 
confession rejects unbelief, superstition or heresy and states what is to believed – the “yes” 
should be heard in the “no”; (c) confession is public – it is not a private affair; (d) confession is 
an action taken freely – nothing is demanded from anyone (Smit 2007b:161- 162).
Every one of these characteristics involves an element of risk. On the first characteristic Smit 
(following Barth) elaborates:
We aim at no results and expect none. We confess because we cannot keep silent. It 
is a serious act, but in its freedom from purpose it has more the nature of a game or 
song than of work or warfare. For this reason confession will always cause head shaking 
among serious people who do not know the particular seriousness of confession (Smit 
2007b:161).
In the words of the Accompanying Letter:
Being fully aware of the risks involved in taking this step, we are nevertheless convinced 
that we have no alternative. Furthermore, we are aware that no other motives or 
convictions, however valid they may be, would give us the right to confess in this way … 
We do not make this confession from his throne and from on high, but before his throne 
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and before other human beings (Smit 2007b:158).
An important reason for confessing being such a risky undertaking is because of the 
ambiguity of what we confess. The old Christian confession that Jesus is Lord will be confirmed 
by all Christians, but we will differ on its contextual implications, what it means. The Belhar 
Confession may also be accepted by the Dutch Reformed Church – hopefully in the near future 
– but we will still need dialogue and debate on what the unity of the church, reconciliation and 
justice in our country and in every local community actually imply.
The ambiguity of confession is not because it is unclear or untrue; it is rather part of the 
wonderful richness of what we confess about God. In Christian theology we are not reflecting 
on an abstract idea that one may call “God”; we are reflecting on the Magnalia Dei, God’s saving 
acts in history – especially on the saving acts of Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection, Christ’s 
reign from the right hand of the Father and his second coming. When we reflect on these 
saving acts, we are doing it from our context. It is not possible to talk about God in an abstract 
way as if God has nothing to do with the situation in which we find ourselves. It is also not 
possible to reflect on God’s saving acts as if they only affect our innermost lives or some future 
destiny. Rather, we are compelled to follow God in our context or situation with its grandeur 
and misère, to confess and live in public.
The ambiguity of confession is also part of being Reformed (Cf. Smit 2009a). Smit refers to 
Barth’s famous answer to the question regarding the possibility of one common confession: it 
is neither necessary nor possible. Reformed confessions are addressed at the whole church as 
a call and an appeal; both are authoritative and provisional – “currently”, “until further notice”. 
According to Smit, Reformed confessions
are not primarily intended as instruments of unity. In fact, they should probably not be 
instrumentalised in any way or for any single purpose. Properly understood, they function 
in a variety of important ways within communities of Reformed faith. They can perhaps 
originate for one main purpose, and gradually change their function and serve other 
purposes as well (Smit 2009b:303 -304).
By functioning in this way, Reformed confessions indeed serve forms of unity in a variety of 
ways and as such constitute a “gathering of fragments”. As doxologies they provide a common 
language of faith; as hermeneutical lenses they provide frameworks with which to deal with 
the diverse and ambiguous collection that is the Bible; as textbooks for instruction they 
provide orientation and identity (Smit 2009b:304 -305). However, the Reformed tradition has
… no central authority, no hierarchical structure, no teaching magisterium, no corpus 
of infallible doctrine, no common canon of biblical interpretation, no continuous and 
unchanging liturgical tradition, no charismatic leadership, no basic ethnic or national 
loyalty, no shared set of religious symbols or legacy of cultic practices, no characteristic 
kind of religious experience, no special kind of spirituality, not even one common and 
universal book of confessions. Instead, it is a tradition that claims in radical fashion that it 
strives to live by “the Bible alone” – and then admits that it has no final interpretation of 
that Bible and no final authority that can guarantee any interpretation, only a plural and 
ambiguous confessional tradition (Smit 2009b:305- 306).
In a remarkable way this manner of confessing helps Christians to live a life of service and love.
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For Smit confessing is never final; it is an open ended and ongoing dialogue. For this reason 
many of his essays’ titles contain a question mark. He is questioning what has perhaps been 
seen as unquestionable. He is inviting dialogue, calling us to partake in the ongoing dialogue 
…
concluSIon
The dialogue between historicality, orientation and contextuality is not only present in the 
kairos or moment of truth in the situation of a declared status confessionis; it is always present. 
Of course there is the moment of truth where the church cannot but confess her faith for the 
sake of the gospel in a public confession. But there are always little kairoi, little moments of 
truth, where we have to confess our faith publicly. In these little kairoi confessing does not 
occur in the form of a creed, but in different ways of disclosing and opposing false ideologies, 
inhumane customs, self destructive lifestyles, oppressive political structures, laws or customs.
From a hermeneutical perspective the core of Smit’s theological thinking can indeed be 
seen as orientation and ambiguity amidst the dialectic of historicality and contextuality. The 
confession in the creed that Jesus is Lord is Smit’s orientated direction. But this direction is not 
a straight and paved way, it is rather similar to the orientated direction of a river meandering 
through rolling hills. The contextual meaning of the creed is vague and ambiguous, it is not 
known off hand or beforehand. It much rather is discovered within the dialectic of historicality 
and contextuality, within the dialogue with the mothers and fathers, the sisters and brothers. 
It is an ongoing and open ended way of doing theology, an adventurous discovery – even 
more exhilarating and dangerous than river rafting!
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